Sardar Patel

I am not sure I agree completely with the criticism. America did take a stand on Korea, a military stand, that some people wish India had taken on Tibet, and America is still at war to this day. Besides Korea has easy ocean access, Tibet is remote even today. Tibet is so remote, India did not even have ways to get ground intelligence on Akshai Chin, a territory it supposedly claimed or at least disputed. India going all in to defend Tibet was perhaps not a real option. Especially when you consider that Nehru was a die-hard socialist. He probably thought Lenin's 1917 revolution was a good thing, and he thought Mao was a good guy who wanted the best for China's poor. After all, both Mao and Nehru had just defeated major imperialist forces. So to Nehru it looked like both were anti-imperialist and socialist. India going all out to defend Tibet was not an option. And if it was, why did America not go all out? America didn't. Perhaps the only thing that might have saved Tibet was a Chinese non-aggression.

On the other hand, Patel does come across as more of a realist. If he had lived another 10 years, things might have been different. Nehru did not handle the India-China war well. He was in shock the war even happened. Nehru's strengths lay elsewhere. But we should not be too harsh on him with our 20/20 hindsight. Remember, the Cold War had already started, and Nehru was not exactly on the American side.

But a full fledged study and criticism is always welcome, if only to learn the lessons of history.

Like they say, the past is not even past. India China still don't have a final border. Goes on to show, Nehru's problems were not easy as some make it sound. If those problems are still thorny today, they must have been more so back then. And you have to take into account the lack of infrastructure back then. No roads, no satellites, weak communication.

Patel's letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on 7 November 1950
I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibet ...... The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instill into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. ....... the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. ....... we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. ...... It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. ......

indicates that even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends.

...... With the Communist mentality of "whoever is not with them being against them", this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note. ...... we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into UN and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the UN. Inspite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism perhaps mixed with a little hostility. .........

I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill.

....... Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences.

It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.

....... In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from

the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble.

........ In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century. China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans and Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of the potential trouble between China and ourselves.

Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that the communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other.

Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. ............ Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers. The former has

a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous.

........ While our western and north-western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. .......

for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously.

Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with communist China in the north and in the north-east, a communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us............ The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. ........

Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force: it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age.

...... In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by

enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy.

......... We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policies to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident....... Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature, etc., from them. They had to contend with the difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers on the east or with the long seaboard. They shall now have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese communists and through them to other foreign communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and communists would now be easier. Instead of having to deal with isolated communist pockets in Telengana and Warrangal we may have to deal with communist threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern frontiers, where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals in China. ........

the action will have to be fairly comprehensive, involving not only our defence strategy and state of preparations but also problem of internal security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose

Nehru and the China-Tibet blunder
In the year 1950, two momentous events shook Asia and the world. One was the Chinese invasion of Tibet, and the other, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. ..... By all canons of logic, India should have devoted utmost attention to the immediate situation in Tibet ...... But Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Prime Minister did exactly the opposite. He treated the Tibetan crisis in a haphazard fashion, while getting heavily involved in Korea. ...... India today is paying for this folly by being the only country of its size in the world without an official boundary with its giant neighbor. Tibet soon disappeared from the map. As in Kashmir, Nehru sacrificed national interest at home in pursuit of international glory abroad. ...... India at the time maintained missions in Lhasa and Gyangtse.

Due to the close relations that existed between India and Tibet going back centuries and also because of the unsettled conditions in China, Tibet’s transactions with the outside world were conducted mainly through India. Well into 1950, the Indian Government regarded Tibet as a free country.

........ The Chinese announced their invasion of Tibet on 25 October 1950. According to them, it was to ‘free Tibet from imperialist forces’, and consolidate its border with India.

Nehru announced that he and the Indian Government were ‘extremely perplexed and disappointed with the Chinese Government’s action...’ Nehru also complained that he had been ‘led to believe by the Chinese Foreign Office that the Chinese would settle the future of Tibet in a peaceful manner by direct negotiation with the representatives of Tibet…’

....... in September 1949, more than a year before the Chinese invasion, Nehru himself had written: “Chinese communists are likely to invade Tibet.” The point to note is that Nehru, by sending mixed signals, showing more interest in Korea than in Tibet, had encouraged the Chinese invasion; the Chinese had made no secret of their desire to invade Tibet. In spite of this,

Nehru’s main interest was to sponsor China as a member of the UN Security Council instead of safeguarding Indian interests in Tibet.

......... when the Chinese were moving troops into Tibet, there was little concern in Indian official circles. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, went so far as to pretend that there was ‘lack of confirmation’ of the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet and that to protest the Chinese invasion of Tibet would be an “interference to India’s efforts on behalf of China in the UN”. ........ Panikkar was more interested in protecting Chinese interests in the UN than India’s own interests on the Tibetan border! Nehru agreed with his Ambassador. He wrote,

“our primary consideration is maintenance of world peace… Recent developments in Korea have not strengthened China’s position, which will be further weakened by any aggressive action [by India] in Tibet.”

So Nehru was ready to sacrifice India’s national security interests in Tibet so as not to weaken China’s case in the UN! ....... the two greatest influences on Nehru at this crucial juncture in history were Krishna Menon and K.M. Panikkar, both communists ....... Sardar Patel remarked that Panikkar “has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions.” India eventually gave up its right to have a diplomatic mission in Lhasa on the ground that it was an ‘imperialist legacy’. This led to

Nehru’s discredited ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’. Mao had no reciprocal affection for India and never spoke of ‘Chini-Hindi Bhai Bhai’— or its Chinese equivalent.

Far from it, he had only contempt for India and its leaders. Mao respected only the strong who would oppose him, and not the weak who bent over backwards to please him. ........ Sardar Patel warned Nehru:

‘Even though we regard ourselves as friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as friends.”

He wrote a famous letter in which he expressed deep concern over developments in Tibet, raising several important points. In particular,

he noted that a free and friendly Tibet was vital for India’s security, and everything including military measures should be considered to ensure it.’

......... ‘In Kali Yuga, we shall return ahimsa for ahimsa. If anybody resorts to force against us, we shall meet it with force.’ But Nehru ignored Patel’s letter. The truth is that India was in a strong position to defend its interests in Tibet, but gave up the opportunity for the sake of pleasing China. It is not widely known in India that

in 1950, China could have been prevented from taking over Tibet.

......... Patel on the other hand recognized that in 1950, China was in a vulnerable position, fully committed in Korea and by no means secure in its hold over the mainland. ....... The world in fact was looking to India to take the lead. The highly influential English journal The Economist echoed the Western viewpoint when it wrote: ‘Having maintained complete independence of China since 1912, Tibet has a strong claim to be regarded as an independent state. But it is for India to take a lead in this matter. If India decides to support independence of Tibet as a buffer state between itself and China, Britain and U.S.A. will do well to extend formal diplomatic recognition to it.’ ....... Nehru ignored Patel’s letter as well as international opinion ....... With such a principled stand, India would also have acquired the status of a great power while Pakistan would have disappeared from the radar screen of world attention. Much has been made of Nehru’s blunder in Kashmir, but it pales in comparison with his folly in Tibet.

As a result of this monumental failure of vision—and nerve—India soon came to be treated as a third rate power, acquiring ‘parity’ with Pakistan. Two months later Patel was dead.

...... Even after the loss of Tibet, Nehru gave up opportunities to settle the border with China. To understand this, it is necessary to appreciate the fact that

what China desired most was a stable border with India.

....... the Chinese proposal amounted to the following: they were prepared to accept the McMahon Line as the boundary in the east—with possibly some minor adjustments and a new name—and then negotiate the unmarked boundary in the west between Ladakh and Tibet. In effect, what Zhou-en-Lai proposed was a phased settlement, beginning with the eastern boundary. Nehru, however, wanted the whole thing settled at once. The practical minded Zhou-en-Lai found this politically impossible.

And on each visit, the Chinese Premier in search of a boundary settlement, heard more about the principles of Pancha Sheela than India’s stand on the boundary.

He interpreted this as intransigence on India’s part.........

China in fact went on to settle its boundary with Mayammar (Burma) roughly along the McMahon Line following similar principles.

Contrary to what the Indian public was told, the border between Ladakh (in the Princely State of Kashmir) and Tibet was never clearly demarcated. As late as 1960, the Indian Government had to send survey teams to Ladakh to locate the boundary and prepare maps. But the Government kept telling the people that there was a clearly defined boundary, which the Chinese were refusing to accept. .......... Had Nehru recognized this he might have proposed a creative solution like asking for access to Mount Kailash and Manasarovar in return for Chinese access to Aksai Chin. The issue is not whether such an agreement was possible, but no solutions were proposed. ........ Nehru deceived the Indian public in his pursuit of international glory through PanchaSheel. PanchaSheel, which was the principal ‘policy’ of Nehru towards China from the betrayal of Tibet to the expulsion of Dalai Lama in 1959, is generally regarded as a demonstration of good faith by Nehru that was exploited by the Chinese who ‘stabbed him in the back’. This is not quite correct, for Nehru (and Krishna Menon) knew about the Chinese incursions in Ladakh and Aksai Chin but kept it secret for years to keep the illusion of PanchaSheel alive. ...... Now Thimayya had proof of Chinese incursion. When the Army presented this to the Government, Menon blew up. In Nehru’s presence, he told the senior officer making the presentation that he was “lapping up CIA propaganda.” .......

He was still trying to sell his PanchaSheel and Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai to the Indian public.

Even today, Nehru’s family members exercise dictatorial control over the documents pertaining to this crucial period. Even documents in the National Archives are not available to scholars without permission from the Nehru-Gandhi family heirs. This is to protect his reputation from being damaged by the truth (But many of the same documents are available in the British Museum and Library in England)....... In the Bangladesh war, India achieved one of the most decisive victories in modern history. More than 90,000 Pakistani soldiers were in Indian custody. The newly independent Bangladesh wanted to try these men as war criminals for their atrocities against the people of East Bengal. The Indian Government could have used this as a bargaining chip with Pakistan and settled the Kashmir problem once and for all. Instead,

Indira Gandhi threw away this golden opportunity in exchange for a scrap of paper called the Shimla Agreement.

How things would have been different had Sardar Patel been out first PM?
Nothing much would have changed. ....... Patel died in 1950, and in all likelihood, Nehru would have succeeded him as the next PM(which was more than likely given his popularity at the time)....... Firstly, I'm guessing we wouldn't have lost a portion of Kashmir in the '48 war with Pakistan. Patel would not have gone to the UN before the war was over. ........ Two, Patel was a staunch capitalist, so he would have tried to frame policies based on that, but as mentioned earlier, his tenure woul have been too short for such policies to make an impact in the long run............

besides Kashmir, Patel would likely have negotiated a lot better with the China on the Tibet issue.

.....1947-1950 represented a very tumultuous time in Chinese history. There was a window of opportunity for India to help negotiate a favorable agreement between Tibet and China that would have prevented Chinese armies from ever reaching India's borders. Eventually, China would have invaded Tibet anyways, but a delaying tactic would have helped India secure it's borders....... Nehru completely capitulated and did not provide any kind of substantive support to the Tibetans which led to a collapse of the Tibetan Army at Chamdo. At the very least, Nehru could have made ratification of the 1914 Simla accord a precondition for Indian support to the Chinese position in Tibet. .........

India's poor strategic moves in this time period, directly led to the 1962 debacle in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh


Congress periodical criticises Nehru
Nehru faltered in his initiatives in Kashmir, China and Tibet. ..... Congress won India's first general elections in 1951-52 under Nehru's leadership. Much of India's domestic and foreign policy was based on his ideas in the early years of India's independence....... The article in the latest Hindi edition of the periodical says Nehru should have listened to his deputy prime minister Vallabhai Patel's views on foreign policy....... Today's problems wouldn't have existed had Patel's foresight in the Kashmir issue been considered then .....

"As far as Kashmir is concerned, Nehru was in charge. But it's true that Patel was upset with the decision to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir and take the issue to the United Nations."

...... Nehru sent troops into the state to support India's claim. A UN ceasefire was negotiated, but Kashmir remains deeply unstable to this day. ..... The article also cites a letter that Patel reportedly wrote in 1950 to caution Nehru against China's policy towards Tibet and where "Patel described China as unfaithful, and a future enemy of India"....... Despite efforts at co-operation by both countries, Indian-Chinese border disputes escalated into war in 1962 and Indian forces were decisively beaten..... This had a significant impact on Nehru's declining health and he died in May 1964.
Where was India’s Tibet Policy?
in August 1950, the rumours of an impending Chinese attack had trickled in; it did not bother anybody in the Summer of Delhi........ In a communication to the Chinese Foreign Office on October 2, 1950, he told the Chinese that the Tibetan delegation, at that time in India, would be shortly leaving for Peking for negotiations; the Indian Ambassador expressed the hope that further military action would, therefore, not be necessary. “It will help the peaceful settlement of the Tibetan question if the Chinese troops which might have entered territory under the jurisdiction of the Lhasa authorities could restrict themselves to western Sikang.” ...... To thank the Tibetan Government, the President of the United States had sent three radio sets which were still packed in their crates in 1948. Many officials in Tibet were not keen to have foreigners operate these sets, but as no Tibetans had yet been trained to use them, they remained packed up in crates. ......... From the remote capital of Kham Province, on New Year’s Day 1950, Ford heard an ominous communiqué broadcast by the People’s Republic of China: “The task for the People’s Liberation Army for 1950 is to liberate Taiwan, Hainan and Tibet.” ....... It is difficult to ascertain the true number of Tibetan troops stationed on the 200 mile long border along the banks of the Yangtze, Goldstein speaks of about

3,500 soldiers

, but Ford estimated their strength to be much less. ....... Whatever might have been the number of Tibetan soldiers, they were no match for the Second Field Army based in Sichuan and

led by its Political Commissioner, Deng Xiaoping

. On the other side of the great river more than 40,000 much better equipped troops waited to ‘liberate’ Tibet.......... One of the major problems faced by the Tibetans was the lack of unity between the local chieftains and the Lhasa government. ..... The Chinese Liberation Army was also much better trained and far more disciplined than the Tibetans. .....

the Tibetan State had no clear policy regarding China

....... another question: had India a Tibet Policy at the beginning of 1950? The answer is a clear ‘no.’ ........ In India, the demise of Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister and holder of a more holistic vision on the security issues of the Indian border, stopped the search for a Tibet Policy with all the consequences which can be seen today. ...... In fact, looking at the tragic events in Tibet and the Communist menace over the Himalayas, the populations of Nepal, Sikkim and NEFA would turn towards India for security and support. ......... Tibet is a cultural daughter of India10 and we of lesser Tibet seek the bosom of that gracious mother to receive more nutriment for growth to our full stature in every way. She has given us that [which] we prize above all other things, our religion and culture and it is the experience of having been the recipients of such a precious gift which encourages us to ask for more. The Asoka wheel on her flag, symbol of goodwill for all humanity and her concern for her cultural children calls us irresistibly. Will the great mother refuse to take to her arms one of her weakest and most forlorn and distressed children, a child whom filial love impels to respond to the call? .......... The populations of the Indian Himalayas have remained among the most patriotic of the country. ........ Sardar Patel criticized Chinese intervention in Tibet and said that to use the ‘sword’ against the traditionally peace-loving Tibetan people was unjustified.

No other country in the world was as peace-loving as Tibet.

India did not believe, therefore, that the Chinese Government would actually use force in settling the Tibetan question. ....... The Deputy Prime Minister further states: “In this kalyug we shall return ahimsa for ahimsa. But if anybody resorted to force against us we shall meet it with force.” ...... Unfortunately, this concept would not be acceptable to Nehru and Panikkar. ...... the Ambassador’s position: China and India should in a united way fight the ‘Western dominance’ and the Tibetan issue should not come in the way of the friendship between the two nations. ....... The future proved Patel right and it has now been shown that Mao had planned and prepared the invasion of Tibet for months in advance and the sweet words of Zhou Enlai where only soporific pills to put his idealist Indian ‘brother’ to sleep. .....

It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet.

............. The best proof came three/four years later when at the height of the

Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai euphoria

, Mao began building a strategic road linking Tibet to Sinkiang, cutting across the Indian territory. .......

The Western world was a symbol of imperialism, oppression of the masses and the slavery of the Asian race. While keeping the principle of ‘non-alignment’ as the official Indian policy, many Indian politicians and diplomats felt much closer to the Communists in China or in Russia than the ‘western imperialists.’

........ One thing was forgotten, that the western world and specially the United States with all its imperfections, was also the symbol of struggle against totalitarian and fascist forces and ultimately of freedom. ....... Was the China of 1950 very different from 1962’s China? Or was it the same China who had already decided in 1949 who would be the new leader of Asia and was ready to use all available means to achieve its plans. ...... The first plans for ‘liberating’ the people of Asia were made in the mid-twenties by Stalin who, on the occasion of the opening of University of Orient in May 1925, spoke about the socialist revolution being the motor of the national liberation movements: “you have to win your own independence”, he said. ....... In November 1949, a meeting of the World Trade Union Association was held in Beijing. Moscow accepted that the New China would take the lead and conduct the ‘liberation’ of all the people of Asia. With Soviet help, a detailed plan was prepared by a Liaison Bureau located in Beijing. Its objectives were clear: to create revolutionary nodes and with the help of the working classes liberation should be brought to the entire South Asia and South East Asia through guerrilla warfare which was later to spread to cities. ......... The value of Patel’s letter resides in the fact that the Tibetan issue is not seen from an ideological point of view, but from a very practical angle; it is seen from the point of view of India’s security interests, not from Tibetan or Chinese or Western concerns. ...... He passed away on December 15, five weeks after having written the letter. ....... Nobody was left on the Indian scene to counter or balance Jawaharlal Nehru and his advisors. Some other leaders like Rajendra Prasad, the President of India, Acharya Kripalani, Dr. Ram Lohia tried to oppose the Prime Minister, but without success, they could not match the charisma and aura of the idealist Prime Minister. ....... great clarity of thought and its prophetic tone. ...... Till November/December 1950, India regarded Tibet as a separate and independent nation; it only recognised a vague suzerainty of China over Tibet, which was more a ‘constitutional fiction’ as Curzon had described it. ............. Six months later, as a first consequence of the new policy of non-interference by the Government of India, a 17 Point Agreement would be forced ‘under duress’ on the Tibetans. The further consequence was that the Indo-Tibetan border in the western and eastern sector became the Indo-Chinese border.... It is what the British had tried to avoid at any cost........

The imbroglio created by the idealist views of Nehru remains unresolved.

...... It was wrong to assume that the Chinese had cooled down. As Charles Bell had explained to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, after any action, the Chinese always prefer to wait a bit and see the reaction of their foes. ........ Nehru could only comment: “All this is much the same as has been said before… [but] there are repeated references in the note to China desiring the friendship of India.” ....... In November 1950, Nehru had accepted that the frontier between India and Tibet had de facto become the border between India and China. It was a surprising statement because at that time, the Chinese troops had not marched further than Chamdo and were still several weeks walk away from Lhasa, and several months from the McMahon Line. ......... Nehru adds: “I think it may be taken for granted that China will take possession, in a political sense at least, of the whole of Tibet.”....... He further admits that for the Tibetan people the “autonomy can obviously not be anything like the autonomy, verging on independence, which Tibet has enjoyed during the last forty years or so.” ....... “it is reasonable to assume from the very nature of Tibetan geography, terrain and climate,18 that a large measure of autonomy is almost inevitable.” ....... one reason which motivated Nehru to this easy acceptance of the disappearance of Tibet from the Asian maps, was that

he thought it was in the interest of Tibet to have a socialist regime

. For Nehru, the old theocratic system had to be reformed and a more ‘democratic’ set-up had to be installed; the ‘liberation’ was Tibet’s chance. We should not forget that at the same time, he was himself trying to introduce democracy in Nepal and Sikkim. .......... “it is exceedingly unlikely that we may have to face any real military invasion [of India] from the Chinese side, whether in peace or in war, in the foreseeable future.” ...... “there is far too much loose talk about China attacking and overrunning India. If we lose our sense of perspective and world strategy and give way to unreasoning fears, then any policy that we might have is likely to fail.” ....... This gave a green light to the Chinese to begin building a road on Indian territory. It would take five more years for the Government of India to ‘officially’ discover it. .......

At that time, the main thorn in India’s flesh was Kashmir. One can understand that the Government of India was not keen to open a second front in the Himalayas. It meant a lot of human and financial resources which were hardly available. From the time of independence, Pakistan had been designated as the enemy number one and for many strategists and politicians, it was out of the question to open ‘a second front.’

....... Nehru admitted that: “Pakistan is taking a great deal of interest, from the point of view of the developments in Tibet. Indeed it has been discussed in the Pakistan press that the new danger from Tibet to India might help them to settle the Kashmir problem according to their wishes.” ......... Pakistan systematically took a position opposite to India’s in its dispute with China; whenever India voted against a resolution in the UN, Pakistan voted in favour and vice-versa. We were even told by an informant that when Pakistan saw that India was abandoning Tibet in the UN in 1950, Pakistan informally made it known that they were ready to help support the Tibetan cause. ....... India had two enemies, but refused to accept the existence of one of them ..... “The idea that communism inevitably means expansion and war, or, to put it more precisely, that Chinese communism means inevitably an expansion towards India, is rather naïve.” ...... Nehru thought that in introducing his own brand of socialism in India, he would counter Communist propaganda. ....... “In a long-term view, India and China are two of the biggest countries of Asia bordering on each other and both with certain expansive tendencies, because of their vitality. If their relations are bad, this will have a serious effect not only on both of them but on Asia as a whole.” ...... The ‘Ambassador of China’ as Panikkar is sometimes referred to, had himself admitted, in 1948, that “a China so organized will be in an extremely powerful position to claim its historic role of authority over Tibet, Burma, Indo-China and Siam. The historic claims in regard to these are vague and hazy.” .........

After having lost more than one million of their countrymen, having had more than 6,000 of their monasteries destroyed and their thousand-year old culture erased, the Tibetans can certainly question the validity of this contention!

......... ten months before the Chinese troops entered Lhasa,24 Nehru had already accepted that Tibet could not be saved and that what was formerly the Indo-Tibetan border had already become the Indo-Chinese border.
Nehru's Five Mistakes
Declaration to take Kashmir issue to the UN ....... He said, "As usual Nehru spoke on issues like the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God and others. But after listening to all Sardar

Patel lost his temper. Patel said, 'Jawaharlal Do you want have kashmir ? Or you want to lose it?

The Nehru said - Of course, I want Kashmir. Patel said then, please give your order. Then, without listening to Nehru, Patel told me to pursue military action".Indian military planes were sent in the Srinagar and fitting reply was given to pakistani tribals ........ When the conversation was taking place, Nehru suddenly on November 2 announced on AIR (aakashvaani radio) a unilateral message to the nation that he would raise the issue at the United Nations ,and the decision to join India or Pakistan or remain independent , will be a done by referendum (जनमत संग्रह) among the people of Kashmir. ...... But a uniform civil code has not been implemented in India to date. Any efforts to make a uniform civil code get widely objected by other religions. ........

Nehru had turned down the offer of the United States in 1953 which offered India to be a permanent member of the Security Council of UN instead of that Nehru advised to include China in the Security Council.

..... Nehru's wanted to resolve border disputes with China by peace and deals. No one doubted his motives. But

he failed to read the Chinese wicked moves

. ....... Nehru on linguistic grounds divided Madras State to make Andhra Pradesh, and Bombay State to make Maharashtra and Gujarat. Formation of linguistic states continue , once the process had been started. Today, condition is that over a dozen states are sparking with fire over creation of a separate state in the country.
Kashmir: Nehru’s baby, nursed by Patel
Patel was provided with limited space. Nevertheless, his timely, swift and decisive action saved Kashmir from the perils of imminent danger and ruthless invaders. ......

About 565 princely states had been left to decide their own fate- to adhere to India, to accede to Pakistan or to remain independent, as they wished.

........ Stafford Cripps, the British statesman also thought that it would take at least ten to fifteen years to liquidate them and to merge them with the rest of India. ...... Chandragupta Maurya and Ashoka’s dream had been rekindled in him. ...... ingenuity, resourcefulness and his tact and firmness ....... He coaxed the rulers, cajoled them and even threatened them reluctantly with dire consequences. Sardar Patel warned the princes that they could not exist independently in the wake of the great changes taking place in the country. ....... he faced acute difficulty in integrating - Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. The case of Kashmir was different from other states as it had important international boundaries- to the East was Tibet, to the North-East lay the Sinkiang province of China and to the North-West was Afghanistan. ....... Sheikh Abdullah’s closeness to Nehru, caused apprehension in Maharaja’s mind towards India’s future prime minister and like other Indian Princes, he began to ponder- ‘whether to remain independent, or to accede to Pakistan under pressure or go with India, where the top leadership will be hostile to him and he also toyed with notion of an ‘Independent Jammu and Kashmir.’ Patel’s role in clearing the atmosphere of distrust and indecision and bringing Maharaja Hari Singh closer to India was of far reaching importance. ....... Knowing Pakistan’s intentions about Kashmir and the changing situation, Patel took initiative and a series of steps were taken immediately. Planes were diverted to Delhi-Srinagar route, and wireless and telegraph equipment were dispatched to both ends of the Amritsar-Jammu link. Telephone and telegraph lines were laid between Pathankot and Jammu as well. Sardar Patel further undertook two strategic steps. First, he ensured termination of prime minister Kak’s services and oversaw the appointment of Mehr Chand Mahajan, as the new prime minister. The second was appointment of Lt. Col. Kashmir Singh Katoch, an officer of Indian army as Commander-in-Chief of Kashmir forces. ..These strategic moves by Patel placed India in an advantageous position. ........ The Pakistan invasion of Kashmir began on 22 October, 1947. Some 5,000 tribesmen from Pakistan entered Kashmir, carrying surplus arms and ammunition in nearly 300 lorries from Abbottabad in the NWFP along the Jhelum Valley Road. ....... But Mountbatten emphasised that since Kashmir had not yet decided to accede to either country, it would be improper to send Indian troops into an independent country. Mountbatten who was presiding the committee meeting put two offers- firstly, Hari Singh’s accession should be secured before the troops were dispatched and secondly in view of the composition of the population, accession should be conditional to plebiscite, once law and order had been restored.

Patel found neither proposal appealing but even then, yielded to Nehru’s advice.

....... When Jinnah heard about the unexpected and prompt airlifting of Indian troops to Srinagar, he flew into a rage. Not prepared to lose the valley, he ordered General Gracey to move troops forthwith into Kashmir. Gracey did not carry out the orders; instead he sought approval of the Delhi based Supreme Commander General Auchinleck who was in charge of all the British officers that remained on either side. Auchinleck refused to oblige Jinnah. But he did not give up his plan. He carried out an invasion of Kashmir by the Frontier tribesman. ....... Patel had realised immediately that the battle would be long. ...... Patel took upon himself the task of building the road link. .............

Within a fortnight necessary materials were assembled at worksite, around 10,000 workers were brought in special trains from Rajasthan and the entire workforce involved in round the clock job numbered over 40,000. The 65 miles were completed on time.’ Behind the success of the project lay Patel’s resolute mind.

........ Even in the judgement of Sheikh Abdullah, ‘events took a decisive turn’ after Vallabhbhai’s Srinagar visit. ‘The Sardar did not lose even one minute. He studied the situation and said that the enemy must be driven back.’ ....... General S P P Thorat confirms that ‘our forces might have succeeded in evicting the invaders, if the prime minister (Nehru) had not held them in check and later ordered the cease-fire...’ ......... Patel had a pragmatic and practical approach in dealing with Kashmir and preferred to take timely action whereas it seemed at times that Nehru had emotional attachment for Kashmir- the land of his ancestors and for Sheikh Abdullah. It also appeared that Nehru hesitated in taking firm steps as he was weighed down by international opinion and personal friendship. .......... Jawaharlal’s agreement, albeit on Mountbatten’s persuasion, to make a broadcast, offering a UN-controlled plebiscite in Kashmir was also opposed to Patel’s strong view of timely action in Kashmir and instead of bringing India’s affairs into the vortex of international politics.

Patel said, ‘We should never have gone to the UNO...

at the UNO, not only has the dispute been prolonged but the merits of our case have been completely lost in the interaction of power politics.’ ........ Kashmir was Jawaharlal’s baby and to avoid clashes with Nehru over it, Patel adopted a bystander’s attitude, but helped whenever the situation demanded or he was called upon to do so. ......

‘If all the decision rested on me, I think that I would be in favour of extending this little affair in Kashmir to a full-scale war with Pakistan... let us get it over once and for all.’

....... hard evidence with regard to integration of 565 States indicates that Sardar Patel’s approach would not have allowed the Kashmir problem to arise and even if any problem had arisen, it would have been nipped in the bud.’
Nehru..Was Always Childish..Read Sardar Patel's Views..
Nehru always tried to passify London and Moscow whereas,Patel,believed in Selfrespect without seeking others help..He spent more time in our villages,whereas Nehru spent more time in those fabulous cities.So there was a growing gap in the very Ideology between the two. ..... It was the exemplary skills of Sardar patel which forced all the 550 small princes and zamindars to surrender to Independent India,tho' Nizam of Hyderabad,Kashmir,Junnahath,Trivancore,Bhopal,Jodhpur,and such small kingdoms refused to budge in .Junaahath Nawab openly challenged Patel saying they wd join Pakistan.Mount baton also encouraged Junnahath Nawab to openly revolt against India.Patel was able to tackle all these problems including Kashmir,which alone gave max troubles to Patel as they were constantly instigated by Jinnah from Pakistan......Kashmir Problem,Mountbaton said,can be referred to U.N......Nehru always sided whatever Mountbaton said and Patel was dead against this move of taking Kashmir to UN. ........ Patel sent our troops and there was clear victory for our troops as the infiltrators were successfully repulsed..Alas!Despite this Nehru referred this Kashmir issue to UN which was totally opposed by Sardar Patel..He said "it is purely an internal matter and why should we refer this to UN" ...... Patel raised this issue in the Congress Working committee and Nehru & Patel were at loggerheads on this issue often..Nehru started showing his hatred towards Patel as Nehru always wanted only Yes men around him.There were Nehru Group & Patel Group in the party. ....... Patel who returned to Bombay refused medical attention and died on 15th Dec 1950....Nehru wanted to bring the body to Delhi and give a fitting memorial which was refused by Patel's daughter,Maniben,who knew to what extent Nehru had done the damage on this great Soldier of India.. ........ One man didnt attend the funeral..Chacha Nehru..
Pakistan India China And Borders
WHEN in 1846 Britain brought the Jammu and Kashmir Territories within its Empire, it acquired a boundary problem with China. ........ "a classic pattern for a boundary dispute is present" (The Times of India, December 7, 1950). It was pre-eminently susceptible to a solution....... Nehru replied to Patel on November 18, 1950: "Our major possible enemy is Pakistan. This has compelled us to think of our defence mainly in terms of Pakistan's aggression. If we begin to think of, and prepare for, China's aggression... we might well be got (sic.) in a pincer movement" ...... Nehru laid down the line in regard to the frontier at the very beginning of his note: "We should not raise this question. If China raises it we should express our surprise and point out that this is a settled issue" ....... Nehru added: "This frontier should be considered a firm and definite one which is not open to discussion with anyone" ...... You cannot claim Mexico by showing it as Indian territory on our maps. ..... When and how, then, did the boundary dispute with China arise? First, it was over the old Chinese maps. Nehru complained of them to Zhou in 1954. Interestingly, his memo of July 1, 1954, while drawing a new line unilaterally, instructed the Ministry of External Affairs "to point out to the Chinese government" errors in their maps when occasion arose. ........ Nehru's claim that "the area now claimed by China [in Ladakh] has always been depicted as part of India on official maps" was manifestly untrue. ......

The linear boundary is a modern innovation. In the 19th century the frontier zone (ilaqa) prevailed.

...... India was non-aligned and had friendly relations with China. Pakistan was the United States' much allied ally ...... China was most reluctant to accept Pakistan's proposal and responded only belatedly. It got no territory. Instead, it was Pakistan which secured from China 750 square miles of administered territory. ...... there was no defined boundary right from the Sino-Afghan-India trijunction in the west to the Sino-Nepal-India trijunction in the east. Only the McMahon Line was defined in 1914. Thus, in Kashmir both the boundary to the west as well as to the east of the Karakoram Pass was "still undefined". ...... If the 1842 treaty was decisive, as Nehru asserted in 1959, why did Britain, a far stronger power militarily, ask China repeatedly to define the boundary? Also, why did it not draw up a line unilaterally as Nehru did in 1954? Despite repeated rebuffs, Britain persisted in its efforts. A lot happened after 1846. ........ The Chinese revolution in 1911 induced second thoughts. The Viceroy questioned the Macartney-MacDonald line of 1899: "Russia would be brought thereby within 300 miles of Simla and 150 miles of Srinagar". ..... 1924: "So far as we know there is no officially recognised boundary, though obviously the main Muztagh-Karakoram divide would constitute a natural frontier." ..... The Ardagh line died as a suggestion but survived as a myth ..... Yet after the agreement of 1963 Nehru upbraided Pakistan for giving away those very 11,000 square miles which admittedly were wrongly shown on its map as Kashmir territory. After Independence, India made good the McMahon line and occupied Tibet. China built the road through the Aksai Chin and fanned out westwards. In the entire western sector, to the east and west of the Karakoram Pass, the boundary remained undefined. In 1959, India and Pakistan reacted differently to the situation then obtaining and also to the common historical record. Hence the different results in their respective parleys with China.

Pakistan succeeded in arriving at a boundary agreement on excellent terms. India got bogged down in conflict.

China operationalises biggest dam on Brahmaputra in Tibet, raises concerns in India over water supplies disruption
China on Tuesday operationalised the $1.5 billion Zam Hydropower Station, the largest in Tibet, built on the Brahmaputra river ....... will produce produces 2.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity a year. ..... It will alleviate the electricity shortage in central Tibet ...... China is reportedly building few more dams. China seeks to ally Indian fears saying that they are the run-of-the-river projects which were not designed to hold water. ..... the three dams, Jiexu, Zangmu and Jiacha are within 25 kms of each other and are 550 kms from the Indian border ..... India is concerned that if the waters are diverted, then projects on the Brahmaputra, particularly the Upper Siang and Lower Suhansri projects in Arunachal Pradesh, may get affected.
Patel’s Concerns on Tibet were Driven by Class Rather Than National Interests
Sardar Patel was as much a secularist, as Pandit Nehru was a socialist. The duo could co-exist because Nehru was a willing warrior against communism and Patel agreed to keep RSS at bay. Patel wanted the RSS to dissolve into Congress. Nehru desired the communists to buy his half-baked socialism called the “socialistic pattern”. The two were diiferent to the extent that Nehru could hide his politics under the garb of ‘humanistic paternalism’ - While Patel's saffron slip showed. ...... Nehru who died 14-years later - almost succeeded in his objective to de-fang the communists. ....... Patel’s 07 November, 1950, letter to Nehru is cited as proof of former’s vision and latter’s myopia. .....

Patel did not have to inform Nehru. In 1949, speaking to Indian army officers in Srinagar Nehru had said, “Chinese revolution has upset the balance of power and the center of gravity has shifted from Europe to Asia thereby directly affecting India.“

....... It was well known in early 1950s that the US had embarked on a Soviet containment strategy. Willy-nilly both were too eager to be a part of this western game; because such a global game helped them tame the domestic communists like the BT Ranadive and EMS Namoodripad. ...... Patel wanted an all out aggression against China. Nehru’s approach was more nuanced. Much like the Americans, Nehru saw Mao’s communism as an opportunity drive a wedge in the Soviet camp as well as slice the Indian communist movement. ........ Nehru’s Tibet policy in the early 1950s was in tune with the American thought process. With the Korean front about to open up, America wanted the issue to only simmer and not blow up. Patel was in a hurry to join the western bandwagon and rhetoric on Tibet. And there in lay the genesis of India- China war of 1962. ...... the Chinese never questioned Patel’s tactics in Hyderabad or Kashmir, the question that we need to dispassionately ask is why did Patel shout about Tibet? ....... Post Independent India had been truncated and vast chunks of territory sacrificed at the altar of Western strategic imperatives - similarly, China too had been chipped (Taiwan, Macau, Tibet, and Hong Kong) by the transatlantic big bankers. ......

In 1950s our Air and Naval chiefs were still British - Nehru had PMS Blackette as his military advisor and Chester bowels as his international affairs guru. Under such circumstances, India was as independent as Afghanistan or Iraq is today.

...... The Pakistan front had been kindled through regular arms supplies and support on Kashmir from America. Therefore, any Indian leader who even thought of opening up the China front in the East could hardly be called a visionary. It is for this reason that on Sino-Indian question Patel should fall into the category of class warrior rather than a statesman. .....

The only explanation for these leaders and many others with similar ideological bent of mind is that they were driven by the interests of propertied elite rather than any larger national interests.

India’s Generic Shift From Nehru’s Suicidal Idealism To Patel’s Self Respecting Pragmatism
In this visit Modi-Abe duo gave a clear and unambiguous signal to their common bête-noir on who stands where in the most delicate triangle of today's Asia. ...... the fact that Indian President visited Vietnam via China only to ensure that he was not missed by the Chinese diplomatic radars on his visit to Vietnam. ...... What followed was something that was never seen or expected on such moments earlier during Congress dominated rule in New Delhi when bowing down to Chinese threats and hiding such events from the public view had come to stay as an accepted norm. Unlike ever in the past, instead of downplaying the Chinese incursion, the Indian Prime Minister strongly objected to this act of Chinese army and demanded his guest Mr. Xi to withdraw this aggression. Mr. Modi's argument that Chinese army could not have taken such a step without approval of its high command, Mr. Xi, who also happens to be the head of China's defence forces, had to eat the humble pie. Chinese army contingent vacated this aggression and moved back to its previous position by 9.45pm on the first night of its Commander-in-Chief's stay in India. .......... It also exposed the Chinese government's confused mind in dealing with the new Indian government under Mr. Modi. ......... In the same public speech before a select audience Mr. Xi's attempt to put down India as a 'small' and a 'regional' power did not contribute much in improving feelings on the Indian side either. ...... Chinese practice of issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens from Jammu & Kashmir and Arunachal. ...... Looking at China's claims over Arunachal Pradesh as 'Southern Tibet' the issue appears to go from bad to worse in future more because of internal pressures in China than from India. Chinese think tanks and government controlled media has raised so much hype over past few years on Arunachal that it will be difficult for Mr. Xi's government to climb down. ....... China's offer to open Nathu La road for Indian Hindu pilgrims to visit Kailash Mansarovar will be seen as a welcome step in India. But this issue has its disadvantages also like a double edged knife. It has been seen that most pilgrims on return from the Yatra develop a feeling of hurt by seeing their holy place under Chinese control. ...... Mr. Modi's style of dealing with India's neighbours, China's foes and now with China surely marks a qualitative and generic shift of Indian polity from a six decade old Nehruvian suicidal idealism to a pragmatic and self respecting style for which Sardar Patel has been always remembered and respected.

Revisiting Nehru-Patel Differences
Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, its first deputy prime minister were two towering figures of India’s anti-colonial freedom movement. Both were Mahatma Gandhi’s closest associates and wielded enormous influence within the Congress Party. But their worldviews differed widely, which reflected in their contrasting attempts to shape the trajectory of the freedom movement, the Indian constitution, issues related to integration of the reluctant princely states, and matters relating to combating communal violence. ..... Nehru admitted in a candid letter to Gandhi towards the end of the latter’s life that it was ‘true that there are not only temperamental differences between Sardar and me but also are differences in approach with regard to economic and communal matters’. The intensity of Nehru and Patel’s conflicting opinions were often matters of grave public speculation and embarrassment for the government. ....... proof of some ‘fundamental unity between the two’ ........ These tensions reached an acrimonious climax when Puroshottam Das Tandon supported by Patel defeated ‘Acharya’ J B Kriplani who had Nehru’s backing for the post of Congress President in 1950 ...... Nehru’s revulsion of Tandon interestingly stemmed from his alleged “communal and revivalist outlook" while Patel found him to be only a ‘little pro-Hindu’ ....... Patel also was subjected to unwarranted harassment by some of the Nehru’s female admirers. In his letter to Gandhi dated 7th January 1947, an emotional Patel expressed dismay at Mridula Sarabhai who ‘ha(d) made it her pastime to heap abuses upon (him)’. Patel alleged that she ‘(was) indulging in a nauseating propaganda that (Patel) want(ed) to get rid of Jawaharlal and also found a new Party’ ........ Manibehn, Patel’s daughter had also suspected Mridula Sarabhai and Padmaja Naidu conniving with Rafi Ahmed Kidwai to undermine her father’s position which adversely affected his health ...... It is true that despite their immense differences, both Nehru and Patel found a working relationship which endured till Patel’s death. But it was rendered possible in large measure by Patel’s deep sense of loyalty towards Gandhi, the Congress and the country. It is another matter that Gandhi promoted Nehru over Patel despite the latter enjoying the overwhelming confidence of the Congress Working Committee; an act which required truncation of inner party democracy ........ Nevertheless, Patel did not challenge Gandhi’s wisdom. Sarvepalli Gopal, Nehru’s rather sympathetic biographer, who was otherwise quite critical of Patel, conceded that Patel’s ‘stoic decency’ was a major factor which prevented a permanent schism between the two ...... After Patel’s demise, Nehru became the undisputed leader of the Congress party and ruled with an iron fist. The last semblance of internal democracy within the Congress had truly died with Patel. ..........

Nehru and Patel’s economic views differed drastically. Nehru envisioned a socialist India with the ‘elimination of profit in society…With social service and cooperation taking place of competition

....... He stopped short of forceful redistribution because he felt there was just too little money ........

Patel on the other hand believed that capitalism could be ‘purged of its hideousness’. A native Gujarati raised under the influence of the Swaminarayan Hindu sect, he did not view the spirit of enterprise with disdain.

For him, creation of wealth for ushering in societal prosperity was a desirable trait. He was unfairly charged of being in cahoots with capitalists such as GD Birla, to which he responded by stating that he enjoyed no personal property and that he considered friendship towards all irrespective of their creed or class his duty ....... Had Patel lived longer, it is doubtful if Nehru could have thrust his socialist agenda on the Indian economy. ...... Nehru and Patel’s foreign policies too were fundamentally opposed. Patel rightly questioned the legitimacy of India’s policy in delaying recognition to the state of Israel only to placate the sentiments of its Muslim citizens. He was also perturbed by the approach of Nehru towards the Chinese and was deeply anguished in India being unable to defend the right of the Tibetan people ........

Patel presciently warned Nehru that ‘while we regard the Chinese as friends, they do not regard us as their friends’.

..... Nehru ‘rule(d) out any major attack on India by China’. Moreover, he rejected Patel’s advice of modernizing the army and making adequate security provisions since it would ‘cast an intolerable burden on us, economic or otherwise and it would weaken our general defence position’ ....... Nehru’s brief tryst with disarmament was a disaster. The fate of Tibet and India’s China war can be attributed to Nehru’s lack of foresight, his reluctance to heed to the warnings of his peers, and ultimately his grave pretensions. ....... With regards to Pakistan, Nehru and Patel’s disagreements were further accentuated. Gandhi himself was a key player against Patel in this drama. He went on an indefinite fast in protest against

Patel withholding the payment of Rs 55 crore to Pakistan. Patel had judiciously deferred payment until the issue of Kashmir and its Hindu minorities was resolved to the satisfaction of all stakeholders.

India was under no obligation to pay the entire sum all at once. However, Gandhi’s fastidiousness and his failing health compelled Patel to yield to his demands. .......... for Nehru, as Harmans Singh states, ‘Sheikh Abdullah was the key to first exposing the fallacy of the two nation theory and then establishing the secular credentials of new India’ ...... how Nehru was seized with indecision until an infuriated Patel himself passed the order to carry Indian troops through air which prevented the fall of Srinagar ...... Later, Patel confessed to Baxi Ghulam Mohammad that he was unable to resolve the Kashmir problem since he did not enjoy Nehru’s confidence ...... The Muslim league secured 86.6% of the vote of the Muslim electorate with many pro-India nationalist Muslim candidates losing their deposits ...... post partition it was found India would be home to more Muslims than even Pakistan while large Hindu minorities were left behind in East and West Pakistan ............ Nehru’s policy of combating communalism rested on positioning himself as the paramount defender of Muslim interests while Hindu communal organizations like the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha had to be eliminated from public life. It did not matter that organizations like RSS were responsible for the safety of thousands of Hindus and Sikhs in certain riot torn areas of Pakistan ...... Patel, on the other hand, had a far more nuanced, just and pragmatic view of the situation. He was frank in admitting that the root cause of communal violence in India was the continued pogroms directed against Hindus in Pakistan, East and West. Patel was absolutely committed to securing the lives and property of Indian Muslims. ........ Manibehn had observed her father of ‘worrying day and night’ over the perils which awaited the Hindus in East Bengal, possibly not unlike those in the Pakistani provinces of ‘Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan and Frontier’ where Hindus were on the verge of being history. Patel was deeply anguished at the fate which had befallen those unfortunate Hindu women in Pakistan who were kidnapped, raped and forcibly converted by Islamic fundamentalists ....... Nehru admitted that Hindus were ‘terrified’ of living in Pakistan but immediately qualified with a specious generalization that there was ‘hardly a Muslim in Bengal or even Delhi who has a sense of safety’ ......... Patel believed in the principle of determined action for protection of minorities even at the risk of precipitating military conflict with Pakistan. Nehru believed that averting war was more important, even if it meant making unilateral concessions to Pakistan. This flawed generosity or rather appeasement was subject to exploitation by Pakistan. In fact, Nehru did not really avert wars, he merely deferred them. ....... the reality of partition through the ballot could not be ignored by Patel. ....... Later, RSS received a clean chit as it was not involved in the assassination of Gandhi.Similarly, with regards to the Hindu Mahasabha, Patel agreed that the organization was not involved in the conspiracy ...... Nehru had actually denied K M Munshi’s request on the grounds that a secular government could not engage in religious activity. ....... Patel’s name had long fallen into disuse by carefully crafted and wilful neglect until attempts by Narendra Modi to resurrect his memory and pay homage to his grand contributions in unifying India’s 500 odd princely states through creation of a ‘statue of unity’ ......

in life Patel was painted as ‘an enemy of the Muslims’.

...... a left wing daily published during Indira Gandhi’s early reign indulged in the calumny of dubbing Patel as “a die-hard reactionary, given to even communalism and chauvinism” and that he was “a drag on Nehru” .....

The differences between Nehru and Patel represent two competing worldviews. Nehru’s shaped India’s destiny for a bulk of its independent history. If Patel’s worldview gains currency, and eventually triumphs, India could well be on its way to fulfil its true potential.

Sardar Patel's Letter to Nehru on China dated 07 November,1950
Sardar Patel - A Himalayan Vision for Friendship & Amity
Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel, known as

the Bismarck of India

, took over as Independent India’s first Deputy Prime Minister and the Home Minster at a time when the world situation was turbulent. ...... had Sardar Patel been in charge of external affairs, things would have been handled in a different way and perhaps our borders would have been much more settled and calmer without losing an inch in Kashmir to Pakistan. ....... To the surprise of many Sardar Patel was in favour of India’s continued membership to the Commonwealth. Pt Nehru was of the view that “Purna Swaraj” means severance of ties with the Commonwealth. ...... His pragmatic diplomacy made him to take a decision that no payment of cash-balances be made to Pakistan till Kashmir issue was settled. He advised Finance Minister R.K. Shanmukham Chetty on 12th December 1947 to put off the payment of Rs 550 million to Pakistan. Mr. C.D. Deshmukh, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India approached Gandhi ji, who was already briefed by Pt Nehru and Mountbatten to believe that India was morally bound to transfer the balances to Pakistan . At that time Gandhiji’s fast unto death to restore communal harmony created a public perception that it was directed against Panel’s refusal to give the cash balances to Pakistan. That was the only time when we saw Patel yielding against his wishes and releasing money to Pakistan.

He was of the opinion that Pakistan was created under a nefarious design of the British.

Noted writer Prakash Nanda quotes in his book ' Sardar Patel's Foreign Policy'- "In fact, in one of his letters to industrialist G D Birla, Sardar Patel had clearly linked the creation of Pakistan to the unhindered access of the Western powers to oil in the Gulf region". .......

Sardar Patel was a great supporter of the African unity and wanted India to forge strong ties with African nations.

It’s a great coincidence that while our nation prepares to celebrate his birth centenary, one of the greatest followers of the Patel legacy, Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi is hosting the African Summit , turning it into the biggest international event post independence.
India tells China: Kashmir is to us what Tibet, Taiwan are to you
“He said both countries should see each other's growth as an opportunity and not a challenge.”