26: Iran

Russia is now losing the war in Ukraine Russia entered 2026 with a familiar claim: time was on Vladimir Putin’s side. Moscow still held more territory and expected its larger population and industrial base to produce an eventual victory. Ukraine’s long-range drone and missile campaign has made that conclusion much harder to defend. ....... Russia later rerouted fuel from Siberia and increased imports from Belarus after refinery damage reduced gasoline output and created shortages ......... Moscow suffered about 1.4 million battlefield casualties, including as many as 450,000 deaths, from February 2022 through June 2026 for marginal gains. ...... the idea of an inexpensive Russian victory has collapsed. ......... Russia must protect the front, Moscow, strategic airfields, oil infrastructure, ports, power plants, factories, and commercial logistics. Ukraine chooses where to concentrate each wave, creating a defensive allocation problem the Kremlin cannot eliminate. .............. Moscow can add radars, guns, electronic warfare, and interceptor missiles. It cannot place the same layered defense around every fixed site across 11 time zones. The Omsk attack showed how one successful penetration can create national supply consequences. .............. Russian forces still advance in parts of eastern Ukraine, and Kyiv faces serious manpower, ammunition, and air-defense shortages. Moscow remains capable of inflicting enormous damage. Those facts do not give Putin a credible path to his stated objectives. ..............

Russian advances have slowed sharply while the cost of sustaining them rises.

.............. Putin invaded to subordinate Ukraine, weaken its military, block its Western alignment, and demonstrate Russian power. Ukraine now operates one of Europe’s largest militaries, produces long-range weapons, strikes Moscow and Siberia, damages strategic bombers, and forces Russia to disperse air defenses. Moscow occupies Ukrainian land but has failed to secure the political outcome intended to justify the war. ................ The expectation of inevitable Russian victory depended on Ukraine running out of men, weapons, and time before Russia’s internal costs became decisive. Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign transfers more of the war’s cost into Russian territory while Moscow’s ground forces continue paying heavily for limited movement. ................... As of July 22, Russia faces fuel disruption, repeated attacks near its capital, vulnerable strategic aircraft, slowing advances, and no credible timetable for meeting its territorial demands. Putin began the invasion expecting Ukraine to break. Four years later, Ukraine can strike the Russian interior while Russia remains thousands of square kilometers short of completing its campaign in Donetsk.